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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In this Article I will argue that the debate about the reality of legislative 
intentions and their utility in statutory interpretation is much more 
important than is generally realized.  Its outcome could affect both the 
constitutional doctrine of legislative supremacy and the philosophy of 
legal positivism.  Briefly stated, my argument will be that, for practical 
reasons, skepticism about legislative intentions threatens to undermine 
the doctrine of legislative supremacy.  This might not disturb traditional 
natural lawyers, Dworkinians, or some kinds of legal realists, who reject 
that doctrine.  But it should disturb legal positivists who accept the 
doctrine. 
 *  Professor of Law, Monash University, Australia.  This Article was previously 
published in LEGAL INTERPRETATION IN DEMOCRATIC STATES (J. Goldsworthy & T. 
Campbell eds., 2002), and is republished with the kind permission of Ashgate Press. 




Let me explain.  For practical reasons, statutory provisions cannot 
always be interpreted and applied literally.  The consequences of doing 
so would sometimes be so unreasonable or absurd that no legal system 
could tolerate them.  But there are only a few ways of avoiding those 
consequences.  One way is to accept that statutes should be interpreted 
literally, but deny that they should always be applied accordingly.  That 
is legally possible only if courts have legal authority to override or 
amend statutes.  The problem is that this entails judicial supremacy over 
statutory law.  It is consistent with the traditional natural law claim that 
judges have authority to invalidate unjust laws, which entails judicial 
supremacy over statutes.  It would also be consistent with an extreme 
legal realist claim that the judges possess supreme legislative power, 
which they can use to amend or override statutes.  But both claims are 
inconsistent with constitutional orthodoxy in common law jurisdictions.1
A second way of avoiding the absurdities of literalism is to deny that 
statutes should be interpreted literally in the first place—in other words, 
to hold that their full meanings depend partly on factors other than their 
literal meanings.  If so, then a judge who declines to apply a statute 
according to its literal meaning may nevertheless be applying it 
faithfully according to its true meaning, rather than overriding or 
amending it.  Those who prefer this second way of avoiding literalism 
must make a further choice from one of two general categories of 
theories.  The first category consists of intentionalist theories, which 
hold that the true meaning of a statute is determined partly by the 
intentions or purposes of the legislature that enacted it.  The second 
category consists of natural law theories of meaning, such as those of 
Michael Moore and Ronald Dworkin, which hold that the meaning of a 
statute is partly a function of moral principles, irrespective of the 
legislature’s intentions or purposes (if it had any). 
A possible third category might consist of common law theories, 
according to which the meaning of a statute is partly a function of 
common law principles of interpretation.  But most common law 
theories can be placed in one or other of the first two categories—they 
are either intentionalist theories, insofar as common law principles 
function as presumptions of the legislature’s intentions, or natural law 
theories, insofar as they are principles of political morality ascertained 
and applied in Dworkinian fashion.2  It might be possible to formulate a 
 1. See infra text accompanying notes 39–47. 
 2. The work of Trevor Allan exemplifies both possibilities.  In his early work, he 
argued that common law principles of interpretation were consistent with legislative 
supremacy because they functioned as presumptions of the legislature’s intentions.  
T.R.S. Allan, Legislative Supremacy and the Rule of Law: Democracy and Constitutionalism, 
44 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 111, 114–15 (1985).  In his later work, he defends a Dworkinian 
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nonintentionalist but legal positivist common law theory, holding that 
common law principles (including principles of interpretation) constitute 
a body of positive law that has been made and can be changed by the 
judges.  But that would collapse into a form of judicial supremacism.  If 
statutes depend for their meaning on extrinsic legal principles, regardless 
of the legislature’s intentions, and those principles can be made and 
changed by the judges, then in effect statutes can be changed by the 
judges regardless of the legislature’s intentions. 
To sum up, pure literalism, maintaining that statutes should always be 
understood and applied strictly according to their literal meanings, is not 
feasible.  But the only practical alternatives are judicial supremacism, 
intentionalism, or a natural law theory of meaning.  Because judicial 
supremacism is constitutionally unacceptable, the real choice is between 
intentionalist and natural law theories of meaning.  Legal positivists, by 
definition, should prefer intentionalism. 
As we will see, natural law theories of meaning turn out also to entail 
judicial supremacism.  Consequently, they too are unacceptable.  So the 
ultimate conclusion of this article is that intentionalism provides the only 
practical way of reconciling the sensible interpretation and application of 
statutes with the constitutional doctrine of legislative supremacy.  This 
article could therefore be subtitled, “The Constitutional Function of 
Legislative Intentions.” 
I will not undertake here to defend intentionalism against the 
formidable arguments that have been made against it.  My more modest 
aim is to map out the options, in order to bring what is at stake into 
sharper relief.  But my argument could be used to contribute to a defense 
of intentionalism based on the practical consequences of rival theories of 
interpretation.3
position, according to which the deepest principles of the common law are principles of 
political morality and are used to interpret statutes regardless of the legislature’s 
intentions.  See generally T.R.S. ALLAN, LAW, LIBERTY, AND JUSTICE: THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF BRITISH CONSTITUTIONALISM (1993).  A Dworkinian theory can be called either a natural 
law or a common law theory—the terminology is unimportant. 
 3. For other contributions to the defense of intentionalism, see generally Jeffrey 
Goldsworthy, Marmor on Meaning, Interpretation, and Legislative Intention, 1 LEGAL 
THEORY 439 (1995) [hereinafter Goldsworthy, Marmor], and with respect to constitutional 
interpretation, see generally Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Originalism in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 25 FED. L. REV. 1 (1997) [hereinafter Goldsworthy, Originalism] and 
Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Interpreting the Constitution in its Second Century, 24 MELB. U. L. 
REV. 677 (2000). 




Nor will I undertake here a defense of legal positivism.  But my 
arguments strongly suggest that its plausibility depends partly on that of 
intentionalism.  Without the support of intentionalism, legal positivism 
would probably succumb to one of its traditional rivals—either natural 
law or legal realism.  I do not expect this argument to worry natural 
lawyers, such as Dworkin, Moore, or Heidi Hurd, who for the most part 
reject intentionalism.  Indeed, they would no doubt enthusiastically 
agree that anyone who rejects intentionalism should also reject legal 
positivism.  But I do expect my argument to worry legal positivists who 
are skeptical about intentionalism.  If I am right, they must give up either 
their legal positivism, the doctrine of legislative supremacy, or their 
skepticism about intentionalism. 
II.  THE INTOLERABLE CONSEQUENCES OF LITERALISM 
Here are some examples of actual cases in which interpreting and 
applying statutory provisions in accordance with their literal meanings 
would have had intolerable consequences. 
(1) The Highway Act 1835 included a long section (s.78) dealing 
mainly with improper driving of horse-drawn vehicles.  In the middle of 
the section, the improper riding of any horse or beast was prohibited.  
But the machinery provisions at the end of the section, imposing 
penalties, referred only to drivers, not riders.  When the prohibition of 
improper riding was inserted in Parliament as an amendment, the 
consequential need to amend the penalty provision was apparently 
overlooked.  The court decided that a literal construction would lead to 
an absurd result that Parliament could not have intended—namely, the 
creation of an offense not subject to any penalty.  It adopted a nonliteral 
construction to give effect to Parliament’s apparent intention.4
(2) Section 8(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1972 (UK) provided that in 
certain circumstances any person “driving or attempting to drive” a 
vehicle could be required to take a breath test.  The defendant drove 
through a red light, stopped, and changed seats with his passenger.  He 
was then asked to take a breath test, although by then he was clearly not 
“driving or attempting to drive” the vehicle.  (Indeed, that might have 
been true even if he had remained in the driver’s seat.)  The court held 
that he was nevertheless required to take the test.5
(3) Section 8(1) of the Food and Drugs Act 1955 prohibited the sale of 
“any food intended for, but unfit for, human consumption.”  Some 
 4. Williams v. Evans, [1876] 1 Ex. D. 277, 280–81; see also F.A.R. BENNION, 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: A CODE 299, 679–80 (2d. ed. 1992) (discussing Williams). 
 5. See BENNION, supra note 4, at 668–69 (discussing Kaye v. Tyrrell (1984)). 
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children asked for lemonade, were given corrosive caustic soda, and 
drank some of it.  Read literally, s.8(1) did not apply—the vendor had 
not sold the children food unfit for human consumption, because caustic 
soda is not food.  But the apparent purpose of the provision was to 
protect the public from harmful products being sold as food, and it was 
interpreted accordingly.6
(4) Rule 14(2) of the Magistrates’ Courts Rules 1968 (UK) states that 
at the conclusion of the evidence for the complainant, “the defendant 
may address the court.”  It does not provide that the court must listen to 
the defendant’s address.  Nevertheless, this is surely implied.7
(5) An Alberta bylaw required that “all drug stores shall be closed at 
10 p.m. on each and every night of the week.”  It would be consistent 
with a literal interpretation of these words for a drug store to close 
promptly at 10 p.m., and then reopen a few minutes later.  But the 
Supreme Court of Alberta properly rejected an argument to that effect on 
the ground that only a lawyer could have suggested it.8
(6) Section 16 of the Factories Act 1937 required that dangerous parts 
of machinery be guarded by fences “while the parts are in motion or 
use.”  A worker was injured while repairing an unfenced machine.  To 
carry out the repairs, he had to turn the machinery by hand, which made 
it necessary to remove the fence.  Because he was injured while the 
machinery was in motion, the statutory requirement, if read literally, had 
been infringed.  But the court held that this would be absurd, and 
therefore adopted a more limited construction of the words “in motion.”9
(7) Section 24 (1) of the Social Security Act 1975, providing for 
allowances to be paid to widows, did not contain any express exception 
in the case of widows who had intentionally killed their husbands.  
Nevertheless, the court held that it was subject to an implied exception.10  
Note the similarity of this example to the case of Riggs v. Palmer, which 
Dworkin has helped make famous.11  In Riggs, a New York court held 
 6. Meah v. Roberts, [1978] 1 All E.R. 97, 98–100, 104–06 (Q.B.); see also 
BENNION, supra note 4, at 611–12 (discussing Meah). 
 7. BENNION, supra note 4, at 30. 
 8. Rex v. Liggetts-Findlay Drug Stores Ltd., [1919] 3 W.W.R. 1025, 1025; see 
also JOHN BELL & SIR GEORGE ENGLE, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 67–68 (3d ed. 1995) 
(discussing Liggetts-Findlay). 
 9. Richard Thomas & Baldwins Ltd. v. Cummings, [1955] 1 A.C. 321 (H.L.) (appeal 
taken from C.A.); see also BENNION, supra note 4, at 681–82 (discussing Cummings). 
 10. Regina v. Chief Nat’l Ins. Comm’r ex parte Connor, [1981] 1 Q.B. 758, 759–
60, 764–65; see also BENNION, supra note 4, at 796 (discussing Connor). 
 11. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 23 (1977) [hereinafter DWORKIN, 




that a murderer was not entitled to inherit under his victim’s will, even 
though the relevant Statute of Wills contained no express provision to 
that effect.  Because the case has been frequently discussed in the 
American literature, I will come back to it. 
(8) A statute that penalized noncompliance with automatic traffic 
signals did not include any express exception in cases where the signals 
had malfunctioned due to mechanical failure.  Nevertheless, the court 
held that such an exception was implicit.12
Most of these examples are taken from Francis Bennion’s book 
Statutory Interpretation, which is rich in case studies.  Many other 
examples could be added.  As Bennion writes, “There are . . . very many 
cases cited in this book where courts have attached meanings to 
enactments which by no stretch of the imagination could be called 
meanings the words are grammatically capable of bearing.”13  Legal 
theorists have wrestled with similar examples for centuries—for 
example, the well-known medieval hypothetical of the doctor charged 
with “drawing blood in the street,” after treating an injured man there.  
They are far too numerous to be ignored by legal theorists hoping to 
explicate the nature of statutory meaning and interpretation.  In particular, 
philosophers of language without legal training must beware of abstract 
reasoning that ignores the exigencies of the law in practice.  Some 
theoretical account, consistent with constitutional principle, must be 
given of the way in which such cases usually are, and should be, 
resolved. 
III.  THE ORTHODOX SOLUTION: LEGISLATIVE INTENTION OR PURPOSE 
The orthodox account of the way such cases usually are, and should 
be, decided is based on the concepts of legislative intention and 
legislative purpose.  I will not attempt a philosophical analysis of these 
concepts, or the relationship between them.  Intuitively, intended meanings 
constitute one subset of intentions, and purposes another subset.  When I 
say something, I intend what I say to mean something, and I intend my 
saying it to serve some further purpose.  My intended meaning is not the 
same as my further purpose.  Sometimes, because I have made some 
kind of mistake, my intended meaning does not serve that purpose. 
According to the orthodox account, in examples such as those just 
described, the literal meaning of a provision either does not accurately 
RIGHTS]; RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 15–20 (1986) [hereinafter DWORKIN, LAW’S 
EMPIRE]. 
 12. Turner v. Ciappara (1969) V.R. 851; see also BENNION, supra note 4, at 699 
(discussing Turner). 
 13. BENNION, supra note 4, at 334. 
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communicate its intended meaning, or does not accurately serve its 
further purpose, or violates some other important purpose or commitment of 
the legislature.  These problems can arise for a variety of reasons. 
(1) Sometimes a mistake in the use of words has been made—the 
words used do not accurately express the legislature’s 
intended meaning.  This seems to be true of examples (1) 
and (2). 
(2) Sometimes the legislature’s intended meaning has been 
accurately communicated, but because of some other kind of 
mistake, it fails to serve the legislature’s further purpose.  
This seems to be true of example (3). 
(3) Sometimes the statute’s words by themselves do not fully 
express the legislature’s intended meaning, not because of a 
mistake, but because the intended meaning is obvious to any 
reasonable person and does not need to be fully expressed.  
The intended meaning is communicated partly by implication, 
in addition to the literal meaning of the words.  This seems 
to be true of examples (4) and (5). 
(4) Sometimes an unusual situation has arisen that could not 
reasonably be expected to have been either foreseen or 
expressly provided for.  As a result, the statutory provision is 
under- or overinclusive.  Even if the statute cannot realistically 
be regarded as already providing for that situation by implication, 
the courts may be able to adjust the statute “equitably,” to 
serve the legislature’s purpose.  This is arguably true of 
example (6). 
(5) Sometimes there is a mixture of problems: although an 
unusual situation has arisen, it should have been foreseen 
and expressly excepted from the operation of the statute.  
Here, too, the courts may be able to adjust the statute 
equitably to rectify the legislature’s omission.  This seems to 
be true of examples (7) and (8). 
Several of these reasons concern inevitable human error.  The authors 
of legal documents never express themselves with full clarity and 
comprehensiveness.  In the case of statutes, at least when it is obvious 
that a drafting error has been made, and also obvious what the legislature 
intended to provide, the courts are often prepared to overlook the error 
and give effect to that intention.  The legislature is deemed to have 




succeeded in communicating its intention despite its clumsy mode of 
expression.  In these cases, simple common sense is often sufficient 
evidence of the legislature’s intention—a painstaking examination of 
legislative history is not required.  Extreme nonintentionalism, which 
denies that legislatures ever have ascertainable intentions, is implausible 
partly because it must deny that common sense can play that role.  On 
the other hand, a nonintentionalist who concedes that common sense can 
sometimes make a legislature’s intentions or purposes obvious would 
surely have to concede that other extrinsic evidence might also be 
capable of doing so. 
But as reasons (3) and (4) indicate, human error is not the only reason 
for the inadequacy of literal meanings.  As I have argued at length 
elsewhere, the meaning of almost everything we say depends on 
background assumptions that we take for granted.14  If they are not taken 
for granted, almost anything we say is open to being misunderstood in 
unpredictable and bizarre ways.  For example, when I order a hamburger 
at a fast food store, I take for granted and do not bother to specify that it 
should not be poisonous or inedible.  Moreover, it is impossible to avoid 
this reliance on background assumptions.  Even if in ordering my 
hamburger I do expressly exclude those misunderstandings, it would not 
occur to me to rule out delivery of a hamburger encased in lucite plastic, 
which can be broken only by a jackhammer.15  And if I did expressly 
rule that out, innumerable other bizarre misconstructions would be left 
open.  As John Searle has argued, no matter how many of them I 
expressly exclude, there will be others I cannot anticipate.  Among the 
reasons for this are that, first, many of the crucial background 
assumptions are “submerged in the unconscious and we don’t quite 
know how to dredge [them] up,”16 and second, for every assumption 
spelled out, others would spring up on which the meaning of the 
expanded utterance would depend.17  Each assumption depends for its 
full meaning on others, which together constitute a vast and complex 
network of beliefs and values that are generally not consciously adverted 
to, let alone articulated in language.  Even if it were possible to make all 
of this explicit, the result would be so prolix and convoluted that it 
 14. Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Implications in Language, Law and the Constitution, in 
FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF 
PROFESSOR LESLIE ZINES 150, 158–61 (Geoffrey Lindell ed., 1994) [hereinafter 
Goldsworthy, Implications].  See generally Goldsworthy, Marmor, supra note 3.  See also 
W.J. WALUCHOW, INCLUSIVE LEGAL POSITIVISM 244–45, 257–58 (1994). 
 15. JOHN R. SEARLE, EXPRESSION AND MEANING 117, 127 (1979). 
 16. JOHN R. SEARLE, INTENTIONALITY 142 (1983). 
 17. SEARLE, supra note 15, at 126; SEARLE, supra note 16, at 148; John R. Searle, 
The Background of Meaning, in SPEECH ACT THEORY AND PRAGMATICS 228 (John R. 
Searle et al. eds., 1980). 
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would be very difficult to read, let alone to understand.  What Martinich 
writes of conversation is true of communication generally: “the words 
the participants utter are merely the surface that simultaneously outlines 
and conceals the underlying substance of communication and meaning.”18
This background network of assumptions may not be consciously 
adverted to by either the speaker or the hearer of an utterance.  It would 
therefore be inappropriate to say that speakers intend to communicate 
them, even indirectly.  They form part of the infrastructure that underpins 
communication, rather than of the content of what is communicated.  
They are implicit in communications rather than implied by them.  But it 
does not follow that speaker’s intentions are irrelevant.  When we say 
that something is implicit in an utterance in the sense that it is taken for 
granted, we are saying that the speaker took it for granted.  Texts 
considered as objects completely independent of speakers cannot 
sensibly be said to take anything for granted.19  Those who completely 
reject intentionalism in legal interpretation in effect banish that underlying 
infrastructure of communication from consideration. 
Whether because of human error or the inescapable dependence of all 
communication on background assumptions, legislators never express 
their intentions and purposes with total comprehensiveness and exactitude.  
To restrict statutory meaning to literal meaning would therefore enable 
judges to frustrate those intentions and purposes.  That is why “literalism” 
has long been a byword for a narrow, formalistic, and obstructive approach 
to interpretation.  It excludes implications, which by definition depend 
on something beyond the words actually used, and are sometimes 
indispensable if a statute is to achieve its intended purpose.  It enables 
the proverbial “coach-and-four” to be driven through laws intended to 
enhance public welfare, in order to protect vested interests.  As Bell and 
Engle insist, “Relatively little of what has to be said in a statute can be 
said in such a way that it may not be reduced to utter nonsense by a 
strictly literal and wholly unimaginative construction.”20  For those who 
like to reduce everything to politics, literalism enables conservative 
judges to thwart tax laws, labor laws, and other progressive legislation 
enacted by reformist legislatures.  By the same token, of course, it 
 18. A.P. MARTINICH, COMMUNICATION AND REFERENCE 78 (1984). 
 19. The background assumptions on which communication depends cannot be 
reduced to social conventions that are universally applicable and independent of 
particular contexts.  See Goldsworthy, Marmor, supra note 3, at 461–63. 
 20. BELL & ENGLE, supra note 8, at 68. 




enables reformist judges to frustrate laws enacted by conservative 
legislatures.  But judges should not apply principles of interpretation 
selectively, depending on whether or not they approve of the political 
complexion of the legislature.  Principles of interpretation are bought 
wholesale, not retail. 
For all these reasons, it is often reasonable for a court to depart from a 
provision’s literal meaning on the ground that it is not its true meaning.  
Its true meaning is, instead, partly a function of its intended meaning, at 
least insofar as evidence of its intended meaning is readily available to 
the legislature’s intended audience.21  Even in the case of unusual and 
unanticipated situations that fall within the literal meaning of  a 
provision, and with respect to which the legislature had no conscious 
intention at all, it can make sense to say that it did not intend the 
provision to apply.  That is because one’s conscious intentions, as well 
as one’s words, can only be properly understood in the light of 
background assumptions such as those previously discussed.22  It is 
noteworthy that Dworkin himself now accepts something like this 
explanation of the decision in Riggs, the case in which a murderer was 
held not to be entitled to inherit under his victim’s will, even though the 
relevant statute contained no express provision to that effect.  In Law’s 
Empire, Dworkin rejected what he called the “speaker’s meaning” 
explanation of the decision, based on the idea “that those who adopted 
the statute did not intend murderers to inherit.”23  But he seems to have 
changed his mind, because he now says: 
I continue to think that the majority reached the right decision, in Riggs v. 
Palmer, in holding that, according to the better interpretive reconstruction, those 
who created the Statute of Wills did not intend to say something that allowed a 
murderer to inherit from his victim. . . .  It is a perfectly familiar speech practice 
not to include, even in quite specific instructions, all the qualifications one 
would accept or insist on: all the qualifications, as one might put it, that “go 
without saying.”24
But I have to concede that in some cases this explanation is 
strained—although not as strained as some would maintain.  It is 
 21. I have argued elsewhere that the intended audience consists of lawyers, not the 
general public, because the intended meaning of a statute is sometimes discernible only 
to those with specialized legal knowledge.  Goldsworthy, Originalism, supra note 3, at 
11.  Heidi Hurd might object that in the case of “conduct” rules that appear to be 
addressed to the general public (as opposed to “decision” rules addressed to legal 
officials), lawyers are merely “eavesdroppers.”  Heidi M. Hurd, Sovereignty in Silence, 
99 YALE L.J. 945, 979–80 (1990).  But a much better analogy is to compare lawyers with 
translators. 
 22. For a fuller analysis, see Goldsworthy, Implications, supra note 14, at 160–61. 
 23. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 11, at 352. 
 24. Ronald Dworkin, Reflections on Fidelity, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1799, 1816 
(1997). 
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strained where the literal meaning does communicate the legislature’s 
intended meaning, but does not serve its intended purpose.  In these 
cases it seems more accurate to admit that the court has departed from 
the true meaning of the provision, and in effect amended it.  But that 
admission is consistent with constitutional orthodoxy, provided that the 
intended purpose of the provision is obvious and the court alters its 
meaning only to ensure that it better serves that purpose.  If so, no 
damage is done either to the principle of legislative supremacy, because 
the court is guided by the legislature’s purpose, or to the rule of law, 
because that purpose is obvious to reasonable people.  The court exercises 
the kind of equitable judgment described by Aristotle, who argued that 
when general laws would operate unjustly in unusual situations, they 
should be corrected according to “what the lawgiver himself would have 
said if he were present, and what he would have enacted if he had 
known.”25
We can summarize all this by saying that intentionalism is crucial to 
reconciling the constitutional doctrine of legislative supremacy with the 
sensible interpretation and application of statutes.  This has often been 
recognized.  William Blackstone long ago said that if a statute would 
otherwise lead to “absurd consequences, manifestly contradictory to common 
reason . . . the judges are in decency to conclude that this consequence 
was not foreseen by the parliament, and therefore they are at liberty 
to . . . quoad hoc disregard it.”  On the other hand, “if the parliament will 
positively enact a thing to be done which is unreasonable, I know of no 
power that can control it . . . .”26
More recently, Bennion has expressed the same idea: 
If the result of a literal construction appears absurd or mischievous, the court 
must ask itself whether Parliament really meant it.  There is a presumption that 
Parliament does not intend to do anything that will produce an absurd result.  If 
the court thinks that what it considers to be absurd was really and truly 
contemplated by Parliament, and was deliberately intended, then the court must 
defer to that.27
 25. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 142 (Martin Ostwald trans., Library of Liberal 
Arts 1962). 
 26. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 91 (spelling modernized). 
 27. BENNION, supra note 4, at 338. 




IV.  ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS 
Nonintentionalists often argue either that there are no such things as 
legislative intentions or purposes, because legislatures simply cannot 
have them, or that even if in principle there can be such things, they very 
seldom exist or can be identified.  If this were true, the orthodox account 
of what courts do in these cases would have to be abandoned.  If the 
meaning of a statutory provision cannot be regarded as enriched by 
evidence of legislative intention or purpose—not even the evidence of 
common sense—then it must either (a) be confined to the literal 
meaning(s) of its words, or (b) be enriched by something else, such as 
moral values.  Option (a) is literalism.  Option (b) requires some kind of 
natural law theory of meaning. 
A.  Literalism 
Option (a), literalism, entails that statutes will sometimes have 
meanings that are absurd or extremely unjust.  It also entails that the 
only way a court can avoid applying a provision in accordance with its 
literal meaning is to either disobey, override, or amend it. 
Some legal theorists have suggested that this is, indeed, what the 
courts should sometimes do.  The issue has been discussed in the context 
of the debate between Hart and Fuller, concerning whether the meaning 
of a rule depends partly on its purpose.  Fuller defended the claim that it 
does, partly by relying on examples similar to mine, in which literal 
interpretations lead to unreasonable or absurd results.  Some of Hart’s 
defenders have replied that Fuller’s point goes to the application of rules, 
rather than to their meaning.  There are different versions of this reply. 
Andrei Marmor appears to argue, in effect, that arguments like 
Fuller’s show that judges may sometimes have to disobey the law.  He 
writes that they 
confuse[] the question of what following a rule consists in (which interested 
Hart), with that of whether a rule should be applied in the circumstances.  Even 
if we concede that judges should always ask themselves the latter question 
(which is far from clear), it does not follow that rules cannot be understood, and 
then applied, without reference to their alleged purposes or any other 
considerations about what the rule is there to settle. 
   . . . . 
   . . . [W]hether the rule should be applied (or not) in the circumstances . . . is 
bound to be affected by the moral contents of the particular law and legal 
system in question.28
 28. ANDREI MARMOR, INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL THEORY 136–37 (1992). 
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But this exaggerates and aggravates the problem.  It turns a humble 
problem of statutory interpretation into a challenge to judicial fidelity to 
law.  Judicial disobedience of the law is generally thought to be an 
extreme remedy, to be reserved for truly extraordinary situations in 
which a law is so morally outrageous that the reasons why judges should 
almost always obey the law are outweighed or overridden.  Run-of-the-
mill cases of statutory interpretation in which a literal reading would 
have unreasonable consequences are problematic, but must they be 
treated as posing such a grave moral dilemma?  Is there really no way 
that judges can deal with them except by violating their judicial oaths 
and disobeying the law?  A less spectacular solution would surely be 
preferable. 
Frederick Schauer offers a different version of the same reply, according 
to which judges have legal authority to decline to apply statutes.  
According to him, Fuller’s argument does not show that the meaning of 
a rule depends on its purpose.  All it shows is that sometimes judges 
should decline to follow a rule because doing so would be absurd or 
unjust.29  Moreover, he claims that the Anglo-American legal tradition 
authorizes judges to do this.  For example, he denies that the statutory 
rules considered in Riggs were unclear.  This “was not a hard case in the 
sense of presenting events not covered by existing rules”30—the events 
in question fell plainly within the scope of the relevant statute.31  The 
problem was that this rule provided an answer that “was morally 
uncomfortable.”32  According to him, it is a hard case only 
because the result generated by the most locally applicable rule [the statute] is 
socially, politically, or morally hard to swallow.  In those circumstances . . . 
American practice, and less pervasively English practice, empowers the judge to 
treat the most locally applicable rule as being other than conclusive, subject to 
override or revision on the basis of those factors that made the locally easy case 
hard in the first instance.33
Schauer differs from Marmor by describing this judicial power to 
override or revise statutes as a legal rather than an extralegal power, 
although not necessarily in a legal positivist sense of “legal.”  In Riggs, 
he writes, the court was able to hold that the statute was overridden by a 
 29. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION 
OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 209–10 (1991). 
 30. Id. at 200. 
 31. Id. at 209. 
 32. Id. at 200. 
 33. Id. at 210; on Riggs’s case, see id. at 189–90, 200, 203. 




more fundamental rule, which prohibited people from profiting by their 
own wrongs.34  In other cases, the courts have overridden positive law in 
the service of values that are not “positivistically pedigreed.”35  He uses 
the term “presumptive positivism” to describe a legal system in which 
judges or other officials have this power.  In such a system, rules 
identified by a pedigree test are presumptively binding, but judges have 
power to override them if the reasons for doing so are particularly 
strong.36
In most cases, the result generated by the most locally applicable and pedigreed 
rule controls.  But in every case that rule will be tested against a larger and 
unpedigreeable set of considerations, and the rule will be set aside when the 
result it indicates is egregiously at odds with the result that is indicated by this 
larger and more morally acceptable set of values.37
Schauer’s explanation of the decision in Riggs is inconsistent with the 
explanation given by the court itself.  As Jeremy Elkins has pointed out, 
“[T]he court went out of its way to argue that it was interpreting the 
Statute of Wills, rather than displacing it.”38  Worse still, Schauer’s 
explanation of the decision is vulnerable to a fatal constitutional 
objection.  According to the principle of legislative supremacy, courts 
are legally required to obey any statute that is constitutionally valid.  
Statutes are not subordinate to judge-made common law principles—if 
there is any inconsistency between them, the common law principles 
rather than the statute must give way.  This is certainly the position in 
Britain, whose constitution is based on the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty.39  And the principle that statutory law is superior to common 
law is equally applicable in the United States.  Of course, American 
legislatures are not fully sovereign in the same sense in which the British 
Parliament is because they do not possess legally unlimited legislative 
authority.  But their authority is limited only by their national and state 
constitutions.  The judges have no authority to hold a statute void except 
on the ground that it violates a constitutional provision.  In Calder v. 
Bull, when Justice Chase suggested that American courts might have 
authority to hold statutes void for violating extraconstitutional principles, 
Justice Iredell strongly disagreed.40  As a leading constitutional law 
 34. Id. at 189. 
 35. Id. at 201. 
 36. Id. at 196–206. 
 37. Id. at 205. 
 38. Jeremy Elkins, Frederick Schauer on the Force of Rules, in RULES AND 
REASONING: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF FRED SCHAUER 79, 90 (Linda Meyer ed., 1999).  
Ronald Dworkin agrees with this.  See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 11, at 16. 
 39. For the position in Britain, see generally JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY, THE SOVEREIGNTY 
OF PARLIAMENT: HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY (1999). 
 40. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 385, 398 (1798) (Iredell, J., concurring). 
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treatise explains, “In form, the Supreme Court has adopted the views of 
Justice Iredell . . . .”41  “[T]he philosophy that the Justices would 
overturn acts of other branches only to protect specific constitutional 
guarantees has been the formal guideline of the Supreme Court at every 
stage in its history.”42
In his Commentaries on American Law, Chancellor Kent wrote, “[T]he 
principle in the English government, that the parliament is omnipotent, 
does not prevail in the United States; though, if there be no constitutional 
objection to a statute, it is with us as absolute and uncontrollable as laws 
flowing from the sovereign power, under any other form of government.”43  
Roscoe Pound agreed.  After summarizing the British doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty, he wrote, “Except as constitutional limitations 
are infringed, the same doctrine obtains in America.”44  Admittedly, 
some American constitutional guarantees are famously “open ended” 
and have been interpreted extremely broadly.  But that provides no 
support for the unrelated proposition that the courts may overturn or 
amend statutes that are inconsistent with ordinary common law 
principles, such as that people should not profit from their own wrongs.  
As Kent Greenawalt explains, “[a] constitutional marking of some 
domains as off limits represents a conscious choice to leave remaining 
domains to legislative authority.”45  That is why, according to Robert 
Summers: 
[American] constitutional law provides that, in matters of valid legislation, the 
legislature is supreme.  That is, the legislature’s meaning is supposed to control, 
not the substantive political views of the judiciary.  This principle of legislative 
supremacy is expressly or implicitly embedded in the federal and state 
constitutions.46
 41. 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 15.1 (3d ed. 1999). 
 42. Id. at § 15.5. 
 43. 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 503 (10th ed. Little, Brown & 
Co. 1860) (1826); see also THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE 
AMERICAN UNION 87–89 (Little, Brown & Co. 1868) (describing the plenary powers of 
Congress as bounded only by the Constitution). 
 44. Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 Harv. L. Rev. 383, 392 (1908). 
 45. KENT GREENAWALT, LEGISLATION: STATUTORY INTERPRETATION—TWENTY 
QUESTIONS 23 (1999). 
 46. Robert S. Summers, Statutory Interpretation in the United States, in INTERPRETING 
STATUTES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 407, 450 (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. 
Summers eds., 1991). 




The principle of legislative supremacy has played a pivotal role in 
recent American debates about statutory interpretation.47  Of course, 
American courts can use their power to interpret statutes to mitigate 
harshness and injustice.  But that is equally true of British courts.  Some 
people think of newly enacted legislation as being enveloped and 
enmeshed by common law principles, which the courts use to subdue 
and domesticate it.48  This is consistent with constitutional orthodoxy 
only up to a point.  A statute can legitimately be interpreted as 
subject to common law principles as long as it is reasonable to 
presume that Parliament intended, or would have intended, this.49  I 
previously acknowledged that in some cases, courts go so far as to 
change the meanings of statutory provisions.  But I added that this is 
consistent with constitutional orthodoxy only if it serves the legislature’s 
purposes in ways that would presumably meet with its approval.  The 
courts thereby remain subordinate to the legislature, acting like agents 
faithfully carrying out the presumed will of their principal, subject to 
rule of law requirements.50
But that way of limiting a power of judicial amendment, and 
reconciling it with legislative supremacy, is not available to literalists.  If 
there are no such things as legislative intentions or purposes, then 
nothing other than the judges’ own value judgments can identify the 
need to change the meaning of a statute, or guide and limit the changes 
made.  If the courts have power to amend or even override some 
statutory provisions, they must be able to do the same to any provision, 
whenever they deem it desirable, all things considered, to do so.  If they 
have power to override or amend the New York Statute of Wills to give 
effect to the common law principle that no one should be permitted to 
profit from a wrong, they must have power to override or amend other 
statutes to give effect to other common law principles.  Their exercise of 
that power can be guided only by their own value judgments.  They 
 47. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. 
L.J. 319 (1989); Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 
78 GEO. L.J. 281 (1989); Edward O. Correia, A Legislative Conception of Legislative 
Supremacy, 42 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1129 (1992); Earl M. Maltz, Rhetoric and Reality 
in the Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Underenforcement, Overenforcement, and the 
Problem of Legislative Supremacy, 71 B.U. L. REV. 767 (1991). 
 48. See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY 
OF LAW AND POLITICS 359 (1994). 
 49. Trevor Allan rightly insisted that this is consistent with legislative supremacy 
in Legislative Supremacy and the Rule of Law, supra note 2, at 111, 121–22, 127, 132–33, 
140–41, although his views have subsequently changed. 
 50. Something like this analogy is usefully developed in RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 269–73 (1990).  By rule of law requirements, I mean that the 
will of the legislature must be publicly ascertainable from the words it enacted and understood 
in the light of contextual evidence that is readily available to its intended audience. 
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might adopt their own limiting rules, as a matter of common law.  For 
example, they might decide that they should override or amend a statute 
only if they regard it as absurd or irrational.  But that would not 
overcome the constitutional objection because the judges would remain 
superior to statutory law.  They would remain the arbiters of the extent 
to which they should exercise their supremacy, with the ability to relax 
their own limiting rules at any time. 
The upshot is that literalism leads either to unreasonable applications 
of statutes, or to a form of judicial supremacy over statutes that is 
inconsistent with prevailing constitutional law. 
B.  Natural Law 
Can option (b), natural law, surmount these objections?  It is important 
to note that there are different versions of natural law theories of 
legislation.  Classical natural law as usually understood is concerned 
with testing human laws for consistency with natural law, and holding 
invalid those that are not consistent.  This is not in itself incompatible 
with an intentionalist theory of statutory meaning and interpretation.  An 
intentionalist classical natural lawyer would interpret statutes in the light 
of the legislature’s intentions, and then test them for consistency with 
natural law.  Alternatively, a literalist classical natural lawyer would 
restrict statutory meaning to literal meaning, and hold a statute invalid if, 
given its literal meaning, it is inconsistent with natural law.  If I am right 
that literal meanings are often absurd or unreasonable, literalist classical 
natural lawyers would have to invalidate statutes much more frequently 
than intentionalist ones.  But more importantly, classical natural law of 
either type is hard to distinguish from the theories I have just criticized.  
It involves judges overriding statutes, and is therefore committed to the 
same type of unconstitutional judicial supremacism. 
There is another type of natural law theory that arguably does not 
involve judges overriding statutes, and therefore exercising supremacy 
over the legislature.  It denies that when judges refuse to be governed by 
a statute’s literal meaning, they override or invalidate it.  It claims, 
instead, that the judges are ascertaining the statute’s real meaning.  On 
this view, a statute’s real meaning is a function of some combination of 
its literal meaning and moral values.51  These moral values are not used 
 51. Larry Alexander calls theories of this kind “conflationist.”  Larry Alexander, 
All or Nothing at All?  The Intentions of Authorities and the Authority of Intentions, in 




to override the statute; rather, they are supposedly built into it.  I will call 
this type of theory nonclassical natural law. 
I take Ronald Dworkin to have defended something like this kind of 
nonclassical natural law theory in Law’s Empire.52  In describing Riggs, 
he pointed out that none of the judges denied that if the statute, properly 
interpreted, gave the inheritance to the murderer, then they were bound 
to let him have it.  “None said that in that case the law must be reformed 
in the interests of justice.”  In other words, it was not a case of a statute 
being partly overridden or invalidated.  The judges’ disagreement was 
about “what the statute required when properly read.”53  Dworkin 
attempted to explain how the meaning of a statute can be determined 
partly by moral values.  As I have pointed out, in more recent writings, 
he offers an intentionalist explanation of the decision in Riggs.54  But in 
Law’s Empire, he rejected that explanation.  Heidi Hurd has argued that, 
even then, Dworkin did not completely reject intentionalism.55  But even 
if that is true, his theory was at least a hybrid one that combined 
intentionalist and nonclassical natural law elements.  He maintained that 
judges should interpret statutes so as to make them “the best that they 
can be,” consistently with deeper moral principles embedded in the law 
as a whole.56
Others who have defended natural law theories of legislation include 
Hurd and Michael Moore.  I will discuss their theories rather than 
Dworkin’s, because their rejection of intentionalism, unlike his, is 
undoubtedly comprehensive.  In other words, they put forward purer 
versions of natural law theory.  But are their theories examples of 
classical or nonclassical natural law, as I have defined those terms? 
Hurd seems to be a literalist classical natural lawyer.  She denies that 
statutes are communications, which should be understood in the light of 
the intentions of those who made them.  This is because “the legislature 
lacks the intentions required of a speaker and because citizens and 
officials lack the beliefs required of an audience.”57  She claims that 
statutes can therefore only have sentence meanings (that is, literal meanings) 
LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 387, 393–402 (Andrei Marmor 
ed., 1995). 
 52. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 11. 
 53. Id. at 16. 
 54. See supra text accompanying note 24. 
 55. Hurd, supra note 21, at 992–94. 
 56. Dworkin’s then-theory is explained in Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Dworkin as an 
Originalist, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 49, 56–64 (2000). 
 57. Hurd, supra note 21, at 990.  It is pertinent to note that many of Hurd’s 
arguments, to the effect that legislation does not satisfy Paul Grice’s criteria for 
communication, are undermined by Grice’s own modification of those criteria to fit 
examples exactly like those she discusses.  See PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF 
WORDS 112–16 (1989).  I will not pursue the matter here. 
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and not speaker’s meanings, and should be understood accordingly.  
Legislative intentions cannot be authoritative because they do not exist.58  
Only texts can be authoritative.59  Therefore, she says that statutes are 
“like the often-hypothesized novel typed by random chance by the 
thirteen-thousandth monkey chained to a typewriter: meaningful . . . despite 
not having been produced as a communication by anyone for anyone.”60  
This is a refreshingly candid admission of the implications of her approach.  
But it is not immediately clear how this satisfies her goal of constructing 
a natural law theory of legislation, in which statutory law is a function of 
moral correctness rather than pure fact.61  After all, sentence meanings 
are fixed by conventions, which are social facts.  Where does moral 
correctness come into the picture? 
Hurd attempts to show that even if statutory meaning is restricted to 
literal meaning, statutes can still play a useful role as “theoretical 
authorities.”  They can be regarded as “signs”—as evidence—of moral 
truths.  The legislature cannot be regarded as intending to communicate 
those moral truths because it is incapable of having any intentions.  
Instead, the fact that legislation has been enacted gives us good reasons 
to regard what it expressly provides as evidence of our moral obligations.  
An analogy of my own might help.  The fact that most human beings 
believe that murder is immoral might be regarded as good evidence that 
murder really is immoral, because it is unlikely that most human beings 
could be wrong about such a thing.  Similarly, Hurd seems to argue, the 
mere fact that a majority of legislators has voted in favor of a statute 
gives us a good reason to regard what it says as evidence of our moral 
obligations.  This is because legislators usually have appropriate motivations 
and knowledge, and they follow procedures that justify confidence in 
their enactments.62
On this view, statutes do not themselves give us reasons for action.  
Instead, they are evidence of “antecedently existing reasons for action 
generated by antecedently existing moral facts.”63  It follows that the 
authority of statutes is strictly limited.  “To the extent that the legislature 
mistakenly describes or distorts the optimal state of affairs or its 
 58. But note the signs of backtracking in Heidi M. Hurd, Interpreting Authorities, 
in LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 51, 405, 425–26. 
 59. Id. at 425. 
 60. Hurd, supra note 21, at 966. 
 61. Id. at 991. 
 62. Id. at 1010–15. 
 63. Id. at 1009. 




attendant obligations, the legislature will fail to have (theoretical) 
authority for us.”64  Furthermore, “the utterances of the legislature do not 
comprise the content of the law.”65  They are merely defeasible evidence 
of what we are obligated to do. 
It is not the case, therefore, that in failing to comply with a legislative 
description of appropriate action the citizen necessarily violates the law.  For 
the legislature might be wrong about the optimal legal state of affairs and wrong 
thereby about the appropriate action to take in a given situation . . . .66
An individual’s different conclusions about her obligations “are sometimes 
more accurate statements of the (statutory) law than are the conclusions 
reached by the legislature.”67  If so, the citizen’s “failure to comply with 
the utterances of the legislature is not a failure to comply with the 
law.”68  Not every erroneous statute can be disobeyed; otherwise, none 
would be authoritative.  But Hurd leaves to another occasion the 
problem of estimating just how erroneous a statute must be to forfeit its 
status as law.69
Presumably, then, Hurd would explain the decision in Riggs as an 
example of a court deciding that a statute erred (by failing to prohibit a 
murderer from inheriting under his victim’s will), and setting aside the 
statute in favor of its own, more accurate, judgment about the parties’ 
moral obligations.  Presumably, this would also be her explanation of all 
decisions of a similar kind, in which courts decline to apply statutes 
according to their literal meanings.  If so, her approach is that of a 
literalist classical natural lawyer.  The meaning of a statute is determined 
by its literal (or sentence) meanings, but it may be overridden if those 
meanings are inconsistent with the moral values that constitute the true 
law. 
But at the very end of “Sovereignty in Silence,” Hurd makes a claim 
that casts doubt on this interpretation of her theory.  In a very brief 
discussion of statutory interpretation, she writes: 
[A] non-communicative model of legislation would call upon courts to interpret 
a statute by seeking to discover and to achieve the optimal state of affairs of 
which the statute is a natural sign.  This is no more than a long-winded way of 
saying the familiar: that courts should interpret statutes in light of the purposes 
that they may best be made to serve.70
 64. Id. at 1010. 
 65. Id. at 1023. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 1024. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 1026. 
 70. Id. at 1028. 
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One of the strengths of her theory, she adds, is that it can justify the popular 
method of “purposive interpretation,” which calls for the interpretation of 
statutes according to the functions they are designed to serve.71
Now, this claim is difficult to reconcile with the argument that 
precedes it, which at the very least suggests that the meaning of a statute 
is fixed by its literal (sentence) meanings.72  When Hurd refers to the 
purpose or function that a statute is designed to serve, she cannot mean 
some purpose or function that the legislature or legislators had in mind.  
That would be inconsistent with her denial of the possibility of 
legislative intentions.  She must mean what Moore means, in a passage 
she cites, when he writes of legislative purposes.  Moore argues that 
determining the purpose or function of a statute requires recourse to 
“real values:” it involves “constructing the morally best purpose for a 
statute, and construing it by reference to that purpose.”73  There is, in 
fact, no real alternative because the legislature did not have any intention 
that is both useful and discoverable.74  “To use purpose at all (as a judge 
must do to save any interpretation from the silliness of literalism), 
necessitates the construction of a theory of a good society and the search 
for purposes that contribute to that.”75  “Purpose” means not “intent” but 
“function”—the function a statute serves in a just society.76
The problem for Hurd, if she were to adopt Moore’s conception of 
purpose, is that statutes would then be unable to serve as evidence of the 
existence of moral values external to them.  According to Moore, moral 
values help to determine the content of the statute.  But that requires that 
the moral values be known independently of it.  They are evidence of 
what the statute requires, rather than the statute being evidence of what 
they require.  This is inconsistent with Hurd’s theory of the authority, 
and indeed of the whole rationale, of statutory law.  As she explains it, 
If legal texts are to assist us in acquiring subjective moral beliefs that better 
cohere with objective moral maxims, we cannot interpret legal texts so that they 
simply mirror our own subjective moral beliefs. . . .  Institutionally created laws 
and principles should thus be thought to have an autonomy all their own.77
 71. Id. 
 72. See id. at 966. 
 73. Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 
277, 354 (1985). 
 74. Id. at 386. 
 75. Id.; see also Michael S. Moore, The Semantics of Judging, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 
151, 263–65 (1980). 
 76. Moore, supra note 73, at 397. 
 77. Hurd, supra note 58, at 431. 




Turning to Moore’s self-styled “natural law theory of interpretation,” 
the method by which it deploys moral values and whether it is subject to 
any limits are somewhat unclear.  Moore agrees that literalism is untenable 
because literal meanings are sometimes absurd or unreasonable.  He 
agrees that to avoid such problems, statutes must be interpreted in the 
light of their purposes.  But as we have seen, he denies that these can be 
purposes of the legislature that enacted the statutes.  They must be 
purposes that the judges think the statutes ought morally to serve, not 
those that any number of legislators may have had in mind.  Moore’s 
approach is somewhat reminiscent of Dworkin’s in that the judges 
should strive to make statutes “the best that they can be” by attributing 
purposes to them that satisfy dimensions of both “fit” and “morality.”  
The judge must attempt to find the morally best purposes that “fit” the 
statute, in the sense that a rational legislature could have enacted it in 
order to pursue those purposes.78  But the “fit” requirement is flexible—if 
the judge is unable to “fit” a morally compelling purpose onto the literal 
meaning of a statute’s words, he can stretch or even overrule that 
meaning in order to achieve his objective.  In deciding what a word in a 
statute means, a court “ought to balance off its linguistic intuitions 
against its ethical intuitions about what, in rules of this sort, the word 
ought to mean.”79
His [the judge’s] linguistic intuitions provide him with provisional interpretations of 
the nature of the speech act about which he is endeavoring to discover some 
purpose.  The less satisfactory he finds the purpose of an act under its provisional 
interpretations, the broader he should be willing to stretch his linguistic intuitions 
about those interpretations in order to “discover” purposes he likes better.  In 
this way he trades off his two sets of intuitions against each other; he uses a less 
ordinary interpretation of a term to further a more morally justifiable purpose. 
   There may be no set of acceptable purposes for a particular statute that a judge 
could find intelligibly promoted by it unless he greatly stretches his linguistic 
intuitions.  Only then does he become self-conscious of his necessarily creative 
role.80
Riggs can again be used as an example.81  When the Statute of Wills is 
subjected to Moore’s “purposive interpretation,” moral values are 
supposedly used not to override it, but to help determine its meaning.  
They do so by qualifying or modifying its literal meaning to produce a 
result consistent with the purposes that the judges believe it morally 
ought to serve.  Thus, despite its literal meaning, it is interpreted as not 
allowing murderers to inherit under their victims’ wills. 
 78. Moore, supra note 75, at 259–60, 293–94. 
 79. Id. at 278. 
 80. Id. at 294; see also Moore, supra note 73, at 385. 
 81. Riggs is discussed in Moore, supra note 75, at 277–78. 
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But if this kind of interpretation is permissible, are there any limits to 
the extent to which the meaning of the actual words of a statute can be 
bent, stretched, or overridden?  According to the orthodox justification 
of nonliteral interpretation, the scope for modifying literal meanings is 
limited by the presumed intentions and purposes of the legislature.  But 
Moore’s purposive interpretation is not subject to any such limit.  Does his 
argument permit a court to decide that a statute morally ought to serve 
some valuable purpose, and then “interpret” it so that it does, no matter 
what it actually says?  On this point, his position is not entirely clear. 
Moore sometimes suggests that there are no limits to the ability of this 
kind of “creative interpretation” to achieve just results.  He says that 
there is no case “in which the linguistic intuitions are so strong that the 
ethical intuitions might not be determinative the other way.”82  This 
suggests that there is no case in which the language of the statute is so 
intractable that it cannot be interpreted to make it consistent with a 
morally compelling purpose.  In other words, the “dimension of fit” never 
poses an insurmountable obstacle to a resolution that is satisfactory 
according to the “dimension of morality.”  “If the strain on meaning is harsh 
enough, a judge may ‘overrule’ the ordinary meaning by acknowledging 
that this is a term of art in the law, guided by the law’s special purposes 
and not by ordinary meaning.”83
On the other hand, Moore elsewhere argues that there are limits.  He 
writes that the ordinary meaning of a statute must not be overridden 
except to further a moral purpose that is sufficiently pressing to 
outweigh the “rule of law” values that support adherence to literal 
meanings.84  The judge must weigh the rule of law values against the 
moral values that would be promoted by overriding those meanings.  It 
would seem to follow that the literal meanings might sometimes prevail, 
even if they have unjust consequences.  This is confirmed by Moore’s 
repeated claims that, in very extreme cases, a judge might have to 
overrule a statute’s purpose as well as its words in order to prevent 
injustice or absurdity.  The judge must always ask a final, “safety-valve” 
question of justice.85  This would be unnecessary if judges could always 
override literal meanings in order to interpret statutes consistently with 
whatever purpose or purposes they ought morally to serve. 
 82. Id. at 278. 
 83. Moore, supra note 73, at 385. 
 84. Id. at 321, 385; see also id. at 313–20 for a description of the rule of law virtues. 
 85. Id. at 386–87. 




Moore’s overall position, then, seems to combine a nonclassical 
natural law theory of interpretation with a classical natural law theory of 
invalidation, to which a judge can fall back as a last resort in order to 
achieve justice.  Faced with a statute whose literal interpretation and 
application would be unjust, a judge should first strive for a more 
acceptable interpretation by modifying its literal meaning in the light of 
moral values.  Only if the rule of law values make its literal meaning 
intractable, must the judge consider whether its application would be so 
unjust that it should, in effect, be invalidated. 
If I am right that classical natural law, as usually understood, is 
committed to judicial supremacy over statutory law, then Moore’s theory 
involves judicial supremacy at least as a last resort.  But even his 
nonclassical natural law theory of interpretation involves a considerable 
degree of de facto judicial supremacy.  Admittedly, he concedes that 
adherence to literal meanings is supported by “rule of law values.”  But 
the judges have power to weigh those essentially procedural values 
against substantive moral values.  Among the rule of law values that support 
adherence to literal meanings is “the principle of democracy”—the 
principle that “[b]ecause legislatures represent the majority’s wishes 
better than courts do, democracies’ legislatures should have their wishes 
carried out by a judge even if that judge disagrees with the wisdom of 
such wishes.”86  This is what I have called the principle of legislative 
supremacy.  The difference between constitutional orthodoxy and Moore’s 
position is therefore clear.  According to Moore, the principle of legislative 
supremacy is merely one of a number of principles that judges are 
entitled to override if they believe that other, substantive moral values 
are of greater weight.  The degree of deference to be accorded the legislature 
is ultimately a matter for them, and no one else, to decide.  Their decisions 
will inevitably depend on the weight they attribute to the substantive 
moral values they would prefer the legislature’s enactments to serve. 
It should also be noted that insofar as the judges’ interpretations 
depend on rule of law values, they depend on citizens’ expectations, 
which it is the primary function of the rule of law to protect.  But in a 
kind of feedback loop, those expectations must depend partly on the 
judges’ judgments.  If citizens expected statutes to be interpreted according 
to their literal meanings, then it would be prima facie unfair to upset that 
expectation.  But if citizens knew that judges, in interpreting statutes, 
may subordinate their literal meanings to moral values, the citizens 
would be less likely to expect statutes to be interpreted according to their 
literal meanings.  Judges, in turn, would then have less reason to defer to 
literal meanings, and greater scope for creativity.  And there is no good 
 86. Id. at 315. 
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reason for citizens not to know what, according to Moore, is the judges’ 
proper role in this respect. 
The upshot is this: Moore’s classical natural law theory of invalidation 
does not seem qualitatively different from his nonclassical natural law 
theory of interpretation.  Indeed, the former is a seamless extension of 
the latter.  Before the judges are compelled to invalidate a statute, in order 
to comply with overriding moral values, they have considerable latitude 
to determine its meaning.  Determining its meaning involves subordinating 
the words chosen by the legislature to moral values selected by the judges.  
The practical effect is that the legislature is no longer the sole author of 
the statute it enacts.  No matter what it provides, the content of its statute 
will be determined partly by values read into it by the judges.  The 
judges are elevated to the status of coauthors of every statute that comes 
before them for interpretation. 
I am not sure that Moore would deny this.  He acknowledges that the 
judges’ role is creative.  They help to construct statutory meanings, rather 
than merely to discover preexisting meanings that exist independently of 
their own endeavours.87  That may be why he proposes a natural law 
theory of interpretation, rather than of meaning, and defines “interpretation” 
to include decisions about the applications of statutes, as well as 
decisions about the preexisting meanings of their words.88  It is partly 
because he rejects any distinction between interpretation and application 
that, as I have written, there is no qualitative difference between his 
theory of interpretation, and his theory of invalidation.  The difference is 
one of degree rather than kind.  Interpretation is a phase on a continuum 
that ends with invalidation.  Or to put it the other way around, invalidation 
is interpretation, as Moore defines it, pushed to the limit.  In both cases, 
the legislature’s contribution—the words it enacted—are subordinated to 
values chosen by the judges.  During the interpretation phase, the judges 
attempt to preserve some continuing efficacy for the words; at the 
invalidation phase, they give up the attempt altogether.  At the interpretation 
phase, there is at the very least a joint supremacy of the judiciary and the 
legislature acting as, in effect, coauthors.  At the invalidation phase, the 
judiciary comes out on top. 
 87. Moore himself puts the word “discover” in scare quotes and refers to the 
judges’ “necessarily creative role.”  See Moore, supra note 75, at 294 and supra text 
accompanying note 80. 
 88. Moore, supra note 73, at 284 n.14. 




It is hard to imagine a natural law theory of interpretation that would 
not dilute or dispense with legislative supremacy.  That would be the 
effect of any theory limiting the legislature’s contribution to the words it 
enacted, and authorizing the judges to interpret the words nonliterally, in 
order to serve moral values they deem important.  This is made explicitly 
clear in Trevor Allan’s recent work on statutory interpretation, which is 
essentially Dworkinian.  Allan writes that the judicial practice of interpreting 
statutes restrictively, in order to protect important common law principles, is 
“radically inconsistent with a notion of unlimited legislative supremacy” 
and tantamount to the partial invalidation of statutory provisions.89  Even 
if it makes sense to claim that the judges are discovering the statute’s 
“true meaning,” rather than changing it, it cannot be denied that the 
legislature itself is no longer the principal arbiter of that meaning.  Its 
role is so diminished that talk of supremacy no longer seems warranted. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
It is possible to reduce the preceding analysis to a few simple, if 
somewhat rough, propositions.  It seems undeniable that statutes should 
not always be interpreted and applied literally.  If so, their literal 
meanings must sometimes be modified or overridden for the sake of 
other values, intentions, or purposes.  If these are the actual or presumed 
values, intentions, or purposes of the legislature, then legislative 
supremacy over statutes is preserved.  The judicial role is that of an 
agent striving to interpret and apply statutes equitably, so as better to 
serve the legislature’s values, intentions, and purposes.  If, instead, the 
judiciary can change or override the literal meanings of statutes to make 
them consistent with its own values, intentions, or purposes, then it has 
effective supremacy over statutes.  Judicial supremacy can be described 
in natural law terms, which depict the judges as discovering and 
enforcing the “true law”—either what the statutes “really mean,” or 
some “higher law” that is superior to them.  Or it can be described in legal 
realist terms, which depict the judges as exercising supreme legislative 
power according to political rather than legal criteria.  Perhaps these 
different descriptions do not in the end signify any practical differences.  
Either way, the judicial power described is inconsistent with orthodox 
constitutional law in common law jurisdictions, including that of the 
United States.  The important point is that legal positivists—and for that 
matter anyone else—who would prefer to steer clear of judicial supremacy 
over statutory law, should try to steer clear of skepticism about the 
existence and utility of legislative intentions and purposes. 
 89. Allan, supra note 2, at 17. 
